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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
IMPORTANT CASES DECIDED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF KENTUCKY DURING THE
MONTH OF SEPTEMBER.
Burley Tobacco Company v. Vest, et. al. (Decided September 29,
1915.) -Appealfrom Kenton Circuit Court.
In the year 1909, an agreement was entered into between the
Burley Tobacco Society and 40,000 tobacco growers of Ohio,
Indiana and Kentucky, by which the latter were to deliver all
tobacco grown by them to this society to be handled and sold by
it as their agent, and it was further agreed that 10 per cent of
the gross sales of this tobacco was to be invested by the Society,
in the name of the individual growers, in stock in the Burley
Tobacco Company, which was to be organized later, each grower
becoming a stock holder in proportion to the amount invested for
him by the Society.
The stipulated 10 per cent realized from the sales was in-
vested as agreed and the Burley Tobacco and Insurance Company
was incorporated for the purpose of handling and manufacturing
tobacco, by the individuals who were directors. The directors
were to be elected upon the first Tuesday after the first Saturday
in October, in each year. The stock was issued to the beneficial
owners but the voting power was given to the directors of the
Burley Tobacco Society. The incorporators of the Burley Tobacco
Company were to act until their successors should qualify.
At an election in October, 1912, the persons composing the
District Board of the Burley Tobacco Society elected themselves
as directors of the Burley Tobacco Company, which had been
operated by the incorporators, up to this time. After this election
E. B. Stanisfer and W. L. Hudson, as stockholders of the Burley
Tobacco Society and the persons acting as directors of the Burley
Tobacco Company, alleging that they were stockholders in the
company and that the directors were elected in violation of the
articles of incorporation, no notice of election being given to
stockholders; that these directors refused to allow an inspection
of the books of said company and that the majority of stockhold-
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ers of the corporation desired a dissolution. They then prayed
the court to allow the stockholders to elect directors who should
take in charge the property of the corporation and should manage
its affairs. By an amended petition, the company was joined as
plaintiff. Upon the trial the court decided that the provision of
the charter concerning the election of directors was invalid and
that the defendants were not directors of the corporation and
appointed commissioners who conducted an election at which the
stockholders elected the same persons who had been acting as
directors, and at the same meeting expressed their disapproval of
the acts of the plaintiffs. The attorneys for the plaintiffs, Vest,
Tomlin and Byron moved the court to allow them a fee for their
services and to adjudge that it be paid by the Burley Tobacco
Company. It was adjudged that the Company pay them $10,000
for their services. The company objected and excepted and
appealed to this court.
The question to be determinee is: Are the appellees entitled
to have the Burley Tobacco Company pay the fee for the services
which were rendered by them for their clients?
Judge Hunt, in reversing the opinion of the lower court, said:
"There is a difference, however, in the obligation resting upon a
corporation to pay the costs of litigation and counsel fees, between
the cause, where the litigation is instituted by its officers, and
when it is instituted in its behalf by a stockholder. In the former
case, if the officers think it a prudent thing to do, to institute the
litigation, the corporation is bound for the costs, although it may
turn out that the officers were mistaken.
In the latter case the corporation is not bound for the costs of
the litigation, unless it results in a substantial recovery by the
corporation * * * * The result of the litigation, in the
case at bar, was the determination in favor of a stock holder,
that he had the right, by reason of his ownership of stock, to
vote in the election of directors of the corporation, and that the
Board of Directors of the Burley Tobacco Society did not have
the right to vote for him. This right of the stockholders to
vote at the election of directors is a right personal to the
stock holder. The corporation did not recover either money or
property, as a result of the litigation. Before a corporation can
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be held oo have contracted to pay an attorney for his services,
who has instituted a suit for a stock holder, in behalf of the cor-
poration, it must appear that the officers of the corporation have
refused to institute suit for the corporation upon proper demand
or that their interests are such or relation to the subject matter
of the controversy or to the adverse party are such, that it
would be a vain thing to make a demand of them, and they could
not be reasonably expected to take proper care of the rights of
the corporation, and in such a state of case, if the stock holders
set in motion the machinery of the law for the corporation and a
successful suit is maintained and results in the recovery for the
corporation, not for the stock holder, of something substantial,
and the corporation receives the benefit of it, or the bringing
into court a fund for administration or distribution, then a con-
tract is implied that the corporation will pay the fees of the
attorneys for the stock holder, because the suit was for the cor-
poration and it received the benefits of it."
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Commonwealth v. Spiller. (Decided September 29, 1915.) -Appeal
from Franklin Circuit Court.
F. M. Spiller, while acting as agent for the Ohio National
Life Insurance Company, was indicted for violating Section 656
of the Kentucky Statutes which provides as follows:
"Every company, or officer or agent thereof, who shall violate
the provisions of this section, shall be fined in any sum not ex-
ceeding $500., to be recovered by action in the name of the Com-
monwealth, and on collection, paid into the State Treasury."
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the indictment, upon
the ground that the State could not obtain relief by prosecution
under indictment, but only by a penal action in the name of the
State. From this decision the Commonwealth appeals.
The question to be decided was: Is a proceeding, by way of
indictment, an action within the meaning of section 469 of the
Kentucky Statutes, which is as follows: "The term action,
when used in this revision, shall be construed to include all pro-
ceedings in any court of this Commonwealth."
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Chief Justice Miller, in reversing the opinion of the lower
court said: "Section 11 of the Criminal Code provides that a pub-
lic offense for which the only punishment is a fines may be prose-
cuted by a penal action in the name of the Commonwealth. Under
this section, the Commonwealth could have proceeded by a penal
action. But the section is permissive in its terms, and does not
exclude any other form of procedure that is authorized by law.
Furthermore, section 9 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
'All public offenses may be prosecuted by indictment, except:
'1. Offenses of public officers, where a different mode of
procedure is prosecuted by law.
'2. Offenses exclusively within the jurisdiction of justices of
the peace, or of police or city courts.
'3. Offenses arising in the militia, of which a military court
has exclusive jurisdiction."
Under section 9, the Commonwealth may proceed by indict-
ment, or under section 11, it may institute a penal action.
In State v. Carr, 6 Oregon, 134, the court said: "A proceed-
ing by indictment is an action at law." Furthermore, it will be
noticed that section 656 of the Kentucky Statutes does not require
that the fine shall be recovered by a penal action, but merely that
it is to recovered by action in the name of the Commonwealth.
Judgment reversed.
GOVERNMENT CONTROL.
BY CHARLES KERR, JUDGE FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT.
The established doctrine of charter contract, that is a valid
and binding agreement between the state and corporation, the
terms of which are the charter provisions, still obtains so far as
that class of corporations which are strictly private is concerned,
meaning thereby that class of corporations that exercise no pub-
lic functions, as distinguished from that class denoniinated quasi
public. Corporations which are wholly and essentially public,
that is such political organizations as towns, counties, cities, and
